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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
order to ensure more successful prosecutions in the courts of North
Dakota
From the foregoing discussion, it is our considered opinion that
North Dakota has taken a very commendable step in the direction
of clearing its highways of the menace of drunken driving. Through
the adoption of a statute which implies consent to submit to a
chemical test, the conviction rate should increase and the accident-
due-to-alcohol rate should decrease. For those who drive after
taking 'one more for the road,' many will find that it will no longer
be too difficult to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that they were,
in fact as well as law, inebriated. This, because the statute pro-
vides for the obtaining of definite evidence as to the state of in-
toxication in advance - unhindered by the usual obstacles of bellig-
erent motorists and frustrating public policy. More specifically,
the statute provides for the elimination of guesswork from the pro-
secution of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor
cases; it protects innocent victims, for the tests may exonerate as
well as convict; and, most significantly, it helps eliminate the drunk
driver - Public Enemy No. 1 - from North Dakota's streets and
highways.
FREDRICK R. ALM III
RANDOLPH E. STEFANSON.
GROUND WATER: WHAT IS THE LAW
IN NORTH DAKOTA?
I. INTRODUCTION
Most of the seventeen states west of a line drawn from North
Dakota to Texas have had or are having problems dealing with
groundwater law. This becomes increasingly significant now be-
cause of the increasing shortage of water faced by these states.1
The question usually presented is whether a legislature can validly
change the law on the subject because in so doing they might be
depriving some of their citizens of vested rights. This question
brings forth the question of what is a vested right. This situation
is further complicated in North Dakota because of two apparently
conflicting statutes. Statute 47-01-13 declares the overlying land-
1. See Hutchins, Trends in the Statutory Law of Ground Water in the Western States,
34 Texas L. Rev. 157, 182 (1955).
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owner owns all ground water not forming a definite stream. Statute
61-01-01 contends that all waters in the state belong to the public.
There apparently have been no decisions of the North Dakota Su-
preme Court defining or relating to rights to ground waters. How-
ever, a 1960 decision on ground water from the Fifth Judicial Dis-
trict will be discussed infra.
Subterranean waters are usually divided into two principal clas-
ses, namely: (1) underground streams, and (2) waters which ooze,
seep, or percolate through the earth, generally known as percolating
waters.2  Itt is well settled that subterranean waters will be pre-
sumed to be of the percolating vaiety,3 and the party alleging the
water to be an underground stream has the burden of proving it.4
However, this historical legal distinction between the two varieties
of ground water appears to have little basis in fact, as geologists
and hydrologists have sharply criticized beliefs that underground
water exists similar to a natural stream or waterway flowing on the
surface. Ground water statutes of some western states make no
such distinction, but others, including North Dakota,a still include
the historical legal distinction.'
II. DOCTRINES FOLLOWED BY WESTERN STATES
There are several doctrines that are applied to underground
water. One is the English or common-law rule of absolute owner-
ship of percolating waters by the overlying landowner. The result
of extreme application of this rule is that a landowner may exhaust
all of the common supply for a legitimate purpose without liability
regardless of the length of time his neighbors had been using the
water beneficially. North Dakota is one of the few states that
adopted the doctrine of absolute ownership by statute.8 However,
Oklahoma, nothwithstanding such a statutory declaration, modified
the absolute ownership rule by a court decision.' The court held in
that case that despite the language of the statute the landowner
2. 56 Am. Jur, Waters § 102 (1947).
3. 93 C.J.S. Am. Waters § 87 (1956).
4. 56 Am. Jur. Waters § 103 (1947).
5. See, e. g., Thompson and Fieldler, Some Problems Relating to .Legal Control of Use
of Ground Waters, American Waterworks Association Journal, Vol. 30, No. 7, p. 1061
(1938); Foley, Water and the Laws of Nature, 5 Kan. L. Rev. 492 (1957).
6. N.D. Cent. Code § 61-01-01 subsection 2 reads as follows: Waters under the sur-
face of the earth whether such waters flow in defined subterrenean channels or are dif-
fused percolating underground waters; and N.D. Cent. Code § 47-01-13 reads: The owner
of the land owns water standing thereon, or flowing over or under its surface, but not
forming a definite stream. Water running in a definite stream formed by nature over or
under the surface may be used by him as long as it remains there ...
7. Hutchins, Western Water Rights Doctrines and Their Development in Kansas, 5
Kan. L. Rev. 533, 534 (1957).
8. N.D. Cent. Code § 47-01-13.
9. Canada v. Shawnee, 179 Okla. 53, 64 P.2d 694 (1936).
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could have no greater right in the percolating water than a right of
reasonable use.
This absolute ownership rule was originally accepted by decision
or dictum in nearly all the western states.1" But no western supreme
court which has been called upon repeatedly to decide controver-
sies between landowners over a common supply of ground water
Ias continued to adhere to this doctrine.1
Another doctrine is the American or reasonable use rule. This
rule means that the landowner's right to abstract water is not un-
limited or absolute. It is subject to a reasonable use in connection
with the land from which the water is withdrawn, qualified by the
rights of other landowners having similar rights. Another form of
the reasonable use rule is the California doctrine of correlative
rights. Under the correlative doctrine owners of overlying lands
have equal rights to the ground water supply for use on such lands,
and each is entitled to an equitable apportionment if the supply is
not enough for all. This rule, as developed by subsequent decisions,
was instigated by the landmark case of Katz v. Walkinshaw,12
which abrogated the common law rule in California. Also, under
this rule, any surplus above reasonable requirements of landowners
may be appropriated for nonoverlying use.1
3
In California percolating waters tributary to streams are subject
to correlative rights on the part of both owners of overying lands
and owners of land riparian to the streams. The surface stream and
ground waters supplying it or dependent upon it are treated as a
common supply for all who have rights to portions of the supply.
14
Thus, rights to surface and ground waters in California are coordi-
nated on a basis of a reasonable and beneficial use.
Another doctrine, now adopted by statute in twelve of the seven-
teen western states, is the appropriation doctrine.15 This doctrine
follows the theory that he who makes his diversion prior in time is
prior in right. In Idaho, a state with a ground water appropriation
statute, it was held that waters may be appropriated either by the
10. Htuchins, Selected Problems in the Water Law of the West, Misc. Pub. No. 418
U.S. Dept. of Agriculture p. 156 (1942).
11. Id. at 158.
12. 141 Cal. 116, 70 Pac. 663 (1902).
13. Pasadena v. Alhambra, 33 Cal.2d 908, 207 P.2d 17 (1949).
14. Rancho Santa Margarita v. Vail, 11 Cal.2d 501, 81 P.2d 533 (1938); Peabody v.
Vallejo, 2 Cal.2d 351, 40 P.2d 486 (1935); Hudson v. Dailey, 156 Cal. 617, 105 Pac. 748
(1909).
15. Hutchins, Ground Water Legislation, 30 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 416, 419 (1958).
These are Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon,
South Dakota, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. In Arizona and Texas statutory restric-
tions are not based on priority of appropriation. The article further states California, Mon-
tana, and Nebraska have made small beginnings in the field of ground water law.
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statutory permit method or by diversion and application to bene-
ficial use; and either method would give the appropriator priority
over subsequent appropriations. 6
In the evolution of principles governing rights to the use of
ground waters, the general progression has been from the English
rule to the American and correlative rights rules and then to the
doctrine of prior appropriation. The trend to appropriation statutes
for ground water has taken place during the last two decades. How-
ever, the four states with the largest acreages irrigated do not com-
pletely conform: Texas recognizes the English doctrine; Arizona
and Nebraska the rule of reasonable use; California the correlative
rights doctrine. 7
Probably the earliest legislation in the western states pertaining to
ground water was the statute enacted in 1866 by the Territory of
Dakota.' This 'statute, declaring the overlying owner owned the
percolating water, was incorporated 'in the laws of the states of
North and South Dakota, when they were formed out of the original
territory. In a 1932 decision the South Dakota Supreme Court said
that, in view of two previous cases in which its decisions had been
based upon the statute as well as "the law generally," there could be
no serious contention over the principle that the owner of the soil is
the absolute owner of the percolating water therein."9 The South
Dakota court also decided that riparian rights accrued at the time
of settlement on public lands20 and dedication of waters to the
public in the water code did not affect existing riparian rights.-'
Comparatively little litigation over the use of water has reached
the Supreme Court of North Dakota. Cases that have been decided
by the North Dakota Supreme Court have all adhered to the ripa-
rian doctrine without any substantial limitations. Riparian rights
were first recognized in the Dakotas by the United States Supreme
Court decision of Stur v. Beck..22 It was held in Bigelow v. Draper
2
1
that the common law doctrine or riparian rights was in force in the
Territory of Dakotas at the time of the adoption of the state con-
16. Silkey v. Tiegs, 51 Idaho 344, 5 P.2d 1049 (1931).
17. See Hutchins, Trends in the Statutory Law of Ground Water in the Western States,
34 Texas L. Rev. 157, 188-90 (1955).
18. Tent. Dak. Civ. Code § 255.
19. Madison v. Rapid City, 61 S.D. 83, 246 N.W. 283 (1932); Deadwood Central
R.R. v. Barker, 14 S.D. 558, 86 N.W. 619 (1901); Metcalf v. Nelson, 8 S.D. 87, 65 N.W.
911 (1895).
20. Redwater Land & Canal Co. v. Reed, 26 S.D. 466, 128 N.W. 702 (1910); Lone
Tree Ditch Co. v. Cyclone Ditch Co., 15 S.D. 519, 91 N.W. 352 (1902).
21. St. Germain Irrigating Ditch Co. v. Hawthorne Ditch Co., 32 S.D. 260, 143 NW.
124 (1913).
22. 133 U.S. 541 (1890).
23. 6 N.D. 152, 69 N.W. 570 (1896).
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stitution and such rights were under the protection of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution and therefore could
not be. divested by the state constitution. The North Dakota court
adhered to the riparian doctrine as late as 1940.24
However, in 1955, both of the Dakotas took legislative action
limiting the riparian doctrine. The North Dakota Legislature spe-
cifically made ground water subject to appropriation and also de-
clared that "the several and reciprocal rights of a riparian owner,
other than a municipal corporation, in the waters of the state com-
prise the ordinary or natural use of water for domestic and stock-
watering purposes."25 South Dakota repealed its absolute owner-
ship statute in 1955,26 but North Dakota did not. Could failure to
repeal 47-01-13 have been a legislative oversight? It is questionable
what effect this will have on the law in North Dakota. The supreme
court of neither state has had occasion to pass on the 1955 legisla-
tion.
Thus, at the present, it appears North Dakota is, by statute, an
appropriation state and an absolute ownership theory state with re-
spect to ground waters. Obviously the court must do some difficult
interpreting or the legislaure must change the law because the
statutes appears to be conflicting.
-111. 1960 NORTH DAKOTA DISTRICT COURT CASE
In the 1960 decision in the Fifth Judicial District Judge Eugene
Burdick said the rule he believes to be applicable in North Dakota
is that of prior appropriation.27 In this case the plaintiff drilled a
well on a tract of land he owned in 1918 which flowed sixty to
seventy gallons per minute, and this well was used continuously by
the plaintiff on his farm until the time of interference. The defend-
ant city of Crosby drilled a water well on a neighboring tract con-
veyed to them by the Great Northern Railway Company. The rail-
road had received the land from Volkman in 1907. The effect of the
pumping of the Crosby well impaired the underground pressure of
the plaintiffs well. The question decided by the court was whether
the City of Crosby, having applied for and received a water right
from the State Engineer, can lawfully produce its well with impu-
nity. The decision was that the city could not produce its well so as
to injuriously affect the plaintiff as a prior appropriator of water
from the same reservior. And, inasmuch as the city had the power
24. Johnson v. Armour & Co., 69 N.D. 769, 291 N.W. 113 (1940).
25. N.D. Laws 1955, c. 345. This is incorporated in the Century Code in §§ 61-01-01,
01(1).
26. S.D. Laws 1955, ch. 430.
27. Volkmann v. City of Crosby, Civil No. 3199, 5th D. N.D., April 29, 1960.
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of eminent domain, the court said that the city would be required
to respond in damages.
The judge said that it may be suggested that 61-01-01 pretends to
declare the public ownership of the waters involved in this action.
He then stated that such a contention would render the statute in
direct conflict with 47-01-13. He said if 61-01-01 were given such a
construction, constitutional doubts would arise as to the taking of
waters to which the plaintiff is the owner. Judge Burdick stated,
"61-01-01 must be construed as granting to the applicant the right to
appropriate waters not otherwise appropriated. In other words, the
right of appropriation cannot be exercised in a manner that will in-
terfere with waters that have been appropriated lawfully by private
owners.
The judge in this district court case also mentioned that the Re-
ceiver's Receipt was issued to Volkman, the entryman, February 28,
1905. He said his vested rights must be determined as of that date
although the patent was issued to him some time later. And section
61-01-01 was first enacted March 1, 1905 and this section could not
be construed to impair rights that were vested prior to that date.
Also, Volkman's right to the use of underground water was vested
by virtue of 47-01-13 which was first enacted in 1877.
Thus, it appears that if Volkman's Receiver's Receipt had been
issued subsequent to March 1, 1905, his cause of action would have
been thwarted, since his use would not have been perfected by 61-
04-22.28 The judge is evidently saying that a person does not have
to use his rights to have them become vested if he obtained a
Receiver's Receipt prior to March 1, 1905. Consequently it appears
the result would have been the same in this case even if Crosby's
use was prior to that of the plaintiffs Thus the 1905 law, now 61-
01-01, applies only to water on lands in the public domain at the
time of enactment of the statute.
IV. DECISIONS ON MODERN LEGISLATION
The leading case on modern groundwater legislation appears to
be a Kansas case, Baumann v. Smhra,29 decided in 1956 by the fed-
eral district court and affirmed by the United States Supreme
Court.30 Plaintiff in this action claimed the Kansas water appropri-
28. N.D. Cent. Code § 61-04-22. Prescripive water right.-Any person, firm, corpora-
tion or municipality, which used or attempted to appropriate water from any watercourse,
stream, body of water or fromn an underground source for mining, irrigating, manufacturing
or other beneficial use over a period of twenty years prior to January 1, 1934, shall be
deemed to have acquired a right to the use of such water without having filed or prose-
cuted an application to acquire a right of the beneficial usedf such waters..
29. 145 F. Supp. 617 (D.C. Kan. 1956).
30. 352 U.S. 863 (1956).
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ation act violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The court said it has
long been settled that a state may modify or reject the riparian
doctrine and adopt the appropriation system, but in so doing it
must recognize valid and existing vested rights .t Then the federal
tribunal declared, "We do not regard a landowner as having a vest-
ed right in underground waters underlying his land which he has
not appropriated and applied to beneficial use."32
The court also said that even though prior decisions of a state
court have established a rule of property, a departure therefrom in
a subsequent decision does not, without more, constitute a depriva-
tion of property without due process. 3 There is no vested right in
the decisions of a court. They went on to say it is well settled that
a legislature may change the principle of the common law and abro-
gate decisions made thereunder when it is in the public interest. 4
Another Kansas case, dealing with surface waters, earlier upheld
the constitutionality of the Kansas appropriation statutes." They
said here that earlier decisions had been approached on the basis
of individual interest alone. Now they thought it necessary to take
a broader view of the situation and weigh more heavily the public
welfare. The state's highest tribunal claimed unused or unusable
rights predicated alone upon theory become of little if any import-
ance. The court in this case also felt that broad general statements
in earlier decisions must be disregarded or modified to harmonize
with the will of the legislature..
VANCE K. HILL.
RAILROAD, GRANTS, AND CONDEMNATION
Title and Interest Acquired in Railroad Rights-of-Way
I. HISTORY
The concept of land subsidies for the development of the vast
areas of the West was promulgated before the Constitution of the
31. United States v. Rio Grande Darn & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 703 (1899);
Williams v. City of Wichita, Kansas, 279 F.2d 375, 377 (1960).
32. Baumann v. Smhra at 624. For a discussion of the troublesome question of unused
overlying rights, see Kirkvood, Appropriation of Percolating Water, 1 Stan. L. Rev. 1
(1948). Dean Kirkwood believes that limiting vested rights to those actually used is
legally sound. But see, Peabody v. Vallejo, 2 Cal.2d 351, 40 P.2d 486 (1935); San
Bernadino v. Riverside, 186 Cal. 7, 198 Pac. 784 (1921); Burr v. Maclay Rancho Water
Co., 154 Cal. 428, 98 Pae. 260 (1908).
33. O'Neil v. Northern Colorado Irrigation Co., 242 U.S. 20, 26, 27 (191Q).
34. Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 122 (1929); United States v. United Shoe Machinery
Co., 264 F. 138, 151 (8th Cir. 1920).
35. State v. Knapp, 165 Kan. 546, 207 P.2d 440 (1949).
36. Id. at 447.
37. Ibid.
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